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# ERASURE, NON-EXISTENCE, AND THE PRODUCTION OF ECONOMIC LEGIBILITY IN IRAQ

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***ABSTRACT:*** *In this paper, I analyze the production of the image of a singular economic geography for Iraq. I explore the discursive projects of erasure that both preceded and coexists with the U.S.-led military intervention of 2003. My hope is to trouble both the presumed stability of the narrative that posits the authority of a singular economic legibility over a heterogeneous field of economic and social activity. First, I highlight the process of making the national economy of Iraq legible in a particular way that privileges oil's role at the global scale. Turning on the temporal hinge of the invasion itself, the second part of the paper looks at the process of legally organizing and classifying economic actors in the spaces of warfare. By turning attention towards landscapes often described as central to geopolitical statecraft and structures of power, I show that instability and "non-existence" are integral to the structures of this economic vision. As a conclusion, the final part of the paper looks at the ways in which security measures and foreign reconstruction efforts are attempting to project the image of a neoliberal economic singularity into the future, further entrenching this economic vision as an irrevocable truth beyond which there is no alternative. At its most broad, this paper is a "reading for absences" in the landscape of warfare. As such, I look for ways in which monocultural discourse is mobilized to both conceal its own instabilities and the existence of credible alternative economic spaces.*

**Keywords:** *Wartime economies, Geopolitics, Iraq, Oil*

## INTRODUCTION

March of 2008 marked the fifth anniversary of ongoing U.S. military operations in Iraq, operations that now include a vast array of economic and infrastructural development projects as part of the wider geopolitical objective. In this paper, I explore the discursive projects of erasure—the making of myriad forms of "non-existence" (Santos, 2004)—that have been deployed in the production of that state's economic legibility both before and during the current conflict. The paper is divided into three parts, each dealing with a different space and time of Iraq's modern history. The first section deals with the discursive clearing of economic diversity in the half-century preceding the invasion. Here I focus primarily on the material results associated with making "petro-state" the primary rendering of the Iraqi economy. This discourse, framed largely by the West, was dominated by the parallel narratives of Iraq as both a region with vast economic potential stymied (and shielded) by the machinations of a tyrannical dictator and the devastating poverty that resulted from the issuance of economic sanctions. The combination of these two factors yielded a version of Iraq's economy that was consistently marginal to the economic narrative presupposed by the so-called Washington consensus, and yet was nonetheless still central to the long-term security of the global neoliberal economy.

The second section, pivoting around the toppling of the Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime, looks at the process of legally organizing and classifying economic actors in the spaces of warfare. In this landscape, different organizations of violence challenge the presumed stability of global capitalism, revealing grey markets (Nordstrom, 2004) that are both inside and outside of the singular vision of economic order. The invasion itself—premised as it was at various times by the threat of weapons of mass destruction and a more innocuous project of democratization—ushered in the present period marked by waves of sectarian violence and massive foreign capital investment in the oil, security, and infrastructure markets. In this space of violence, development and reconstruction, the diversity of Iraq's economic future is being further funneled into the image of a singularity. The future of Iraq, so the Western narrative goes, will be dominated by neoliberal capitalism: its non-capitalist potential will

be erased by successful, globally integrated reconstruction. The final section of the paper concentrates on how these reconstruction projects (geared towards the future) premised on a global economic singularity for Iraq represent an attempt to guide the state away from diversity and towards a future where, as Margaret Thatcher famously claimed, "there is no alternative." Here I will look at the way in which the imposition of a unitary economic vision is deployed to valorize the efficiency of capitalist development while simultaneously the walls of the newly constructed infrastructure are quite literally crumbling.

This paper shares a number of resonances with the work of J.K. Gibson-Graham (1996; 2006), whose work attempts to break apart the hegemony of capitalocentrism and economic monism. The discourse of capitalocentrism posits the authority and inevitability of a singular capitalist economics over what they see as a heterogeneous field of non-capitalist economic activity. Indeed, they argue that there is nothing about capitalism itself that precludes the existence and functioning of multiple economic imaginaries.[1] While their work tends to focus on spaces that have been defined by capitalocentric discourse as inefficient and marginal, in this paper I look to the processes of spatial and economic erasure at work in the construction of the very discursive core of the imagined capitalist singularity. At its most broad, this is a "reading for absences" (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p. xxxii; Santos, 2004) in the landscape of warfare. As such, I look for ways in which monocultural discourse is mobilized to both conceal its own instabilities and the existence of credible alternative economic spaces. In Iraq, economic and geopolitical discourses have focused on the dominance of oil to the detriment of all other possibilities. It is my hope that by highlighting these erasures, I can further Gibson-Graham's critique by exploring the diversity that exists within the complex economic geographies of war: my goal is to present the making of non-existence.

In his writing on the World Social Forum, sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos lists five key forms of non-existence—monocultures—that typify enlightenment rationality: monocultures of knowledge, linear time, classification, the universal and the global, and capitalist productivity (Santos, 2004, p. 238-39). These singularities can be seen as calling forth anything from capitalist development projects (Gibson-Graham, 2006) to laying the groundwork for the discursive clarity of modern institutions to establishing the presumed limits of political debate. Santos (2004, p. 238) defines monocultures as the modes of production of non-existence, and his primary aim is to unearth a sociology of absences, "an inquiry that aims to explain that what does not exist is, in fact, actively produced as non-existent, that is, as a non-credible alternative to what exists." Through these monocultures, the potentials of the "as yet," the emergent forms of life that exist beyond the confines of categorization, are disappeared, and what remains is the image of modern, rational neoliberal order as the truth beyond which there is no alternative.

These five distinct logics form a framework around which the limits of discourses of modern intelligibility are produced. For Santos, that which falls outside of the scope of these logics is rendered as unintelligible or devalued: that which is not valorized by monocultures is banished to the realm of the non-existent. Thus, a monoculture of knowledge places a premium on modern science as the primary "criteria of truth and aesthetic quality…Non-existence appears in this case in the form of ignorance or lack of culture" (Santos, 2004, p. 238). The privileging of linear time focuses on the legitimacy of the modern over the "backwardness" of that which gets labeled not modern. Likewise, the monoculture of classification deploys the powers of categories and systems of organizing differences to render that which lies beyond the limits of the graph as deviant or abnormal. The monoculture of the universal and the global produces a non-existence in the form of a local scale that lacks credibility and is always at the mercy of systems at the global scale. Finally, criteria of capitalist efficiency and productivity privilege growth and expansion via market forces. Here, non-existence is synonymous with non-productiveness—in terms of human labor as well as natural resources.

In what follows, I attempt a reading for absences in Iraq by confronting the ways that monocultures have been actively deployed to produce a discursive enslavement (Allen, 2003), sequestering economic diversity in a space of non-existence where livelihoods and the potentials of the "as yet" are erased (Santos, 2004). In what ways have these discursive practices had real and lasting material consequences in shaping the economic geography and geopolitical significance of Iraq?

## MONOCULTURAL VISION AND MAKING THE "OIL STATE"

Arun Agrawal (2005), echoing and deploying Michel Foucault's work on governmentality,[2] writes of the nineteenth century project by which forests were discursively made and

subsequently brought under the control of a new regime of governance. By employing new scientific modes of classification and organization centered on calculation and statistics, a specific ensemble of power was produced. This regime of regulatory governance was premised on the visibility of its populations and institutions. Counting and seeing became synonymous with knowing. Governmentality, ultimately, is as much a representational project as it is an epistemological one, mapping systems of order and classification onto the unruly conditions of the life-world.

As with any cartographic enterprise, terrain must be abstracted, scaled, and rendered by the mapmaker so as to convey information clearly. In this translation from landscape (forest, city, state, population) to map, many things are lost or rendered invisible. As Timothy Mitchell writes of the cadastral map in colonial Egypt, "the ... power of human reason to order and take the measure of the world—hid something" (Mitchell, 2002, p. 92). What is hidden is that which exceeds the capacity of the chosen mode of representation. There can be no map that accounts for all aspects of lived space-time, so what the mapmaker chooses to include appears in a negative relation to what they, for one reason or another, exclude. However, as many have noted (Harley, 2001; Mitchell, 2002; Scott, 1998), these losses are accepted because mapping also enables the production of power by constructing a particular quantifiable legibility. This power serves to guide forces, to organize life, and to "naturalize hierarchies" (Santos, 2004, p. 239) through systems of classification such as race, gender, and class. Out of this rationality, Santos notes, forms of non-existence are produced as populations that are subordinated or marginalized.[3] Further, as scholars like Agrawal (2005) and Mitchell (2002) note, statistics, numbers, and cartographic information were particularly powerful tools for colonial powers. This mode of power made populations knowable in the very same way it served to construct the forest. This monoculture of classification, while taking a firm hold in the nineteenth century, expanded its reach and applicability during the Cold War. Then, statistics and calculations of the environment took on increased geopolitical significance, and decisions of war and defense were premised more explicitly on the calculability of data such as lives lost, percent of heavy industry destroyed, and damage caused to capital markets. In the Cold War, the statistical focus of government that grew out of Enlightenment essentialism became one of the prime means of designing foreign policy (Kay, 1995).

Several historians of the sciences have pointed out that the uncritical adoption of this statistical framework was problematic as it reified a reductive lens that isolated diverse cultural and economic practices in space and froze them in time (Haraway, 1991; Kay, 1995; Martin, 1992). It does so by reducing landscapes to a series of dissociated parts that are viewed and analyzed discretely. These pieces then serve as proxies for the whole ecosystem, or more expansively, for the entire life-world. The monoculture of classification, like mapping, relies on linguistic abstractions, simplifications and tropes to produce its legibility. Kay (1995) links the rise of this monoculture not to the inherent logic of the economies or spaces themselves, but to a mid-twentieth century project of public persuasion playing out in the sciences. Cybernetics, information theory, electronic computing and control and communication systems—these projects were deeply embedded within the military experiences of World War II and the Cold War.

Through this Cold War geopolitical lens, power and control begin with visibility. For Santos (2004, p. 237), this control is consistent with his framing of the term hegemony, which he notes "presupposes a condition of constant policing and repression of counter-hegemonic practices." In order for this hegemony to function, the practices and procedures of an economy need to be visible, monitored, and regulated. Those practices that fall outside of the field of intelligibility are often rejected as inefficient or false. Those populations and economic activities that do not fit into the logic of hegemonic capitalism are seen as discardable, as invisible. Looking to the disappearance of the agriculture sector in Iraq over the last 50 years can disclose the production of these invisibilities. Traditional economic metrics point to a startling transformation in Iraq's economy during these years. Alnasrawi (1994) notes that between 1960 and 1979, Iraq's GDP went from \$8.7 billion to \$54 billion (measured in 1980 prices).[4] By 1993, however, its GDP had dropped to \$10 billion and slowly climbed back to \$30 billion by 2000 (CIA, 2004). In parallel with these economic changes was the dramatic increase in the state's population from 7 million in 1961 to 21 million by 1993. Throughout this period, Iraq's economic stability became centered on oil revenue at the expense of agriculture and industry. Indeed, a full 4/5 of Iraqi economic activity in the early 1950s was in the agriculture sector, though it has now all-but disappeared from Iraq's economic analyses.

Encouraging the dominance of this oil-focused discourse was the fact that Iraq during the Hussein regime closely guarded (and in many cases didn't even measure) its economic activity beyond its oil markets (Alnasrawi, 2002). Iraq's other economic

potentials were largely shielded from view and thus beyond the reach of neoliberal economic visibility. Yet at the same time, the state was sitting on and responsible for the management of one of the largest oil reserves in the world. This paradoxical condition was challenging for the West: most of Iraq's economic activity was hidden from view and marginal, but at the same time its resources were central to the structures and security of monocultural capitalism. The resultant rendering of the economic landscape thus consisted of three main elements: a tyrannical hegemon, an inefficient, poorly managed and corrupt oil economy, and flagging agricultural production. From the so-called inside, the country's emergent economic activities were being erased by Saddam Hussein's singular economic vision in favor of a dominant oil economy. Not only was absence being actively produced by the state, it was being produced by the West as well. For Western economists and geopolitical strategists, Iraq's economic problems were centered primarily on the inefficient management of a potentially lucrative (and highly demanded) natural resource. In all of this, Iraqis themselves are largely absent: politically and economically. The twentieth century history of Iraq was:

> "...an endless series of coups and countercoups, conspiracies, purges and counterpurges, violent seizure of power and ruthless suppression of dissent, and last but not least, wars, adventures, and sanctions. In all this history the people had no voice as there has been a virtual absence of democratic institutions and peaceful transfer of power." (Alnasrawi, 2002, p. 51)

The population, especially those outside of the oil sector, had been reduced to both economic and political invisibility through processes of economic homogenizing (from within) and monocultural mapping (from outside): a double erasure. Saddam Hussein began deploying violence in the region to help assure his control of the former, and the United Nations Security Council implemented sanctions as a form of economic coercion that aided in the rendering of the later.

A brief review of the scholarship focused on Iraq's economy in the 1990s shows that beyond all other aspects the United Nations imposed economic sanctions were the most central and most devastating (Alnasrawi, 2001, 2002; Kirshner, 1998; Sanford et al., 1998). These sanctions, which included among other things a full trade embargo, were initially imposed in order to punish the Iraqi regime for its invasion of Kuwait,[5] but were later tied to Iraq's destroying of all weapons of mass destruction following the first Gulf War in 1991.[6] In both cases, the ultimate aim was to depose Saddam Hussein from power by crippling Iraq's economy. The opinion was widely held that economic disorder would foment popular anger at his regime and lead to his overthrow by the Iraqis themselves. Independent of whether or not this was the actual result, as noted above the sanctions were extremely effective at disrupting the economy: research into the number of civilian deaths caused by the sanctions varies, with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimating the number at around 500,000 (Pilger, 2004).[7]

In 1995, pressure from the Clinton Administration in the U.S. led to the introduction of a new regime of economic incentives called the Oil for Food Program.[8] Under this system, Iraq was allowed to sell more oil on the open market in exchange for food, supplies, and medicine. In this particular instance, the care and maintenance of a population (by reducing the number of deaths caused by sanctions) was linked explicitly to the "opening" of one particular mode of economic activity to a particular discourse of global neoliberal capitalism—making one economics visible, calculable, and available to Western business as a simultaneous form of geopolitics and humanitarian intervention. Once the oil market was calculable, classified, and visible, then the lives could be managed. Sanctions thus are seen as a form of hegemonic economic warfare (Alnasrawi, 2002). They assure the production of conditions of control through coercion while maintaining the invisibility of any and all activity that falls outside of the monocultural frame. Sanctions assured a place for the classificatory power of geo-economics alongside geopolitics in international statecraft.

Further, Philippe Le Billon and Fouad el Khatib (2004) note that there has been a shift from the drive to secure "free oil" to the notion of "freedom oil." They focus on the shift in the policy position of the U.S. state from one in which access to oil would ideally be maintained through political and diplomatic negotiations to the envisioning of oil as something which, through proper management and global distribution, would assure the making of politically free peoples. The gravity of this rhetorical change should not be understated: premising a military or economic intervention on a language of free oil is problematic—it would be a resource war. However, premising one on freedom oil is much less so—this could be seen is a humanitarian intervention. Former deputy defense secretary (and later head of the World Bank) Paul Wolfowitz articulated the developmental power of freedom oil in 2003, when he stated in 2003 that "We are dealing with a country

that can really finance its own reconstruction and relatively soon" (Stevenson, 2003) and later noted that "The oil revenues of that country could bring between $50 billion and $100 billion over the course of the next two or three years" (Gerth, 2003). So central was the narrative dominated by oil capital that upon invasion, the oil ministries were guarded by U.S. forces rather than the cultural artifacts that the coalition was purportedly there to liberate.[9]

It is through this legacy of sanctions, statistics, and secrecy that a specific rendering of the Iraqi economy became naturalized in the geopolitical landscape. The monocultural framework that privileges the classifiable and calculable, the global and the market-driven, had pushed all forms of economic activity that did not fall in line with the idea of a global oil economy to the margins—erasing them from the field of credible experience to such a degree that they ceased even being tallied. This version of "the economy," based as it was on a lack of clarity, a lack of knowledge, the invisibility of populations, and the liberating power of oil would be the stage upon which the military intervention would begin in 2003.

## NON-EXISTENCE AT THE FRONTLINES

In this section, I move from outlining the project of erasure involved in making one view of Iraq's economic landscape visible before the invasion of 2003, to looking at the ways in which one can read for absences at the center of the battlefield. Here, I attempt to pry apart the hegemonic narrative of stability and order that purportedly accompany economic monism. By turning attention to spaces of massive capital influx, towards landscapes often described as central to geopolitical statecraft and structures of power, I show that instability is integral to the structures of these monocultural classifications. Into the 'empty' space produced by sanctions and secrecy before the war, comes a particular mode of economic organization that contains further invisibilities. In what follows, I begin to explore the shadowy economies rise to the surface of political geography and geopolitics at the so-called center of capitalist enterprise: warfare.

Carolyn Nordstrom (2004) provides a good jumping off point for a discussion of the diverse economies of war zones. By addressing the supposed separations between the legal practices of day-to-day life and what she calls 'the shadows'. In her analysis, certain formations in the rigidly codified world are rendered invisible—cast out of the light or below the ground. This echoes Boaventura de Sousa Santos' (2004) monocultural forms of "non-existence." At the frontlines of war, discreet characterizations break down, and the image that there is a distinct legal world, and the non-legal sub-world is troubled. These shadowy populations and practices are enmeshed with many others in the economics of warfare, and these economics are very much tied to the triumphant narratives of the monoculture of capitalist efficiency and productivity.

The War on Terror is often lauded or criticized by scholars on both the right and left respectively as the first "privatized war" (Singer, 2004, p. 523). The air of inevitability of capitalist penetration and domination into this landscape attempts to render the possibilities of other economic practices invisible. Discourses of warfare in the West are largely premised on the narrative that war is good for business. Halliburton, Blackwater Security, Lockheed Martin: the all-too-familiar branding of the contemporary military industrial complex. In many ways this discourse of capitalist war draws attention away from the various economies at work throughout its duration, while at the same time, these familiar corporate structures encourage one to read vital connections between the day-to-day capitalist economy and the infrastructure of global war. Additionally, drawing profits from warfare and violence is rendered as an acceptable extension of the big-C Capitalism in which each of us is said to dwell. The result is a significantly reduced "field of credible experience" (Gibson-Graham, 2005, p. 8) which appears only to have space for corporate or state entities inhabiting the battlefield in neat and organized ways, supplying state militaries with the needed resources to complete their task of fighting non-state, non-capitalist, illegal actors efficiently and thoroughly. But is this reading correct? The work of Gibson-Graham compels me to conclude that it is not. Viewing landscapes and populations of war as the reluctant subjects of capitalist warfare not only erases the complex web of economic exchange that occurs in war-zones (as it does in pre-war zones), but also renders as fixed and tidy a landscape that up close is anything but.

One population in militarized Iraq that challenges the clean readings of monocultural capitalist efficiency is the private military contractor (PMC). These firms provide a diverse array of services including the design and construction of barracks, prisons, and dining facilities, laundering services, food preparation, and supply transportation. In addition, PMCs oversee the maintenance of high-tech weapons, provide armed public security, and increasingly form a low cost military regime. In

applying an essentialist mode of thought, it is easy to place PMCs into the constellation of forces that render warfare as "belonging to capitalism" (Gibson-Graham 1996, p. 31).
Yet, their presence in the landscape of war falls outside of international legal regulation, placing them in the very same legally exposed position as grey market[10] arms dealers, illegal enemy combatants running terrorist sleeper cells, and international drug cartels. These non-lawful capitalist formations, and the challenging ethical and economic questions they conjure, appear and are disappeared in the essentialist narrative of capitalist war. They appear in the form of market-based "global" corporate firms. But they disappear into the shadows of international law—into those areas where the distribution of surplus falls outside of the formalized market—hanging in the light by what seems to be only their associations with the market.

Nordstrom (2004, p. 39) writes that the "state and the extra-state, the legal and the illicit, the violent and the peaceful intertwine along the streets and the cafés, the offices and the shops, the politics and the profits shaping the world as it unfolds into the third millennium." She writes from the field of war, which is occupied, supported, and perpetuated by the grey markets of drug trade, weapons dealing, and systems of theft and/or trade within households. These grey market entities can bring food and supplies to keep communities that live in the battlefield alive and nourished just as they can supply weapons to resistance groups to prolong conflict and disorder. In each of her case studies, the agents of violence and profiteering cannot simply be classified as legal or illegal, cannot simply break down into markets and non-markets. The practices of war render the economies and violences of these agents as visible and affective. Yet the discourse of a singular and legal capitalist economy conveys a simultaneous invisibility. On one side of this visible invisibility one sees the construction of a language practice that lauds the privatization of warfare as not only good for the war effort, but also good for the neoliberal economy. However, closer inspection shows a legal and performative affiliation with grey market organizations: groups thrust into non-existence in the shadows of war.

## DEVELOPMENT AND SECURING THE "NOT YET"

The final section of this paper deals briefly with what Santos refers to as the "not yet." The not yet is the way in which the future is inscribed in the present (Santos, 2004, p. 241). It is a form of potency and potentiality in which the future is contained in the recesses of the everyday life-world. I concentrate on the ways in which the various modes of erasure discussed above work to frame and delimit the potential for future diversity—to link a particular form of the present to a not yet in which "there is no alternative."

One specific type of economy and one mode of development have been privileged geopolitically in Iraq: a mode that stresses the global scale, the image of clear legal organization, knowable and mappable economic landscapes, and productive, efficient economic output. But is development in Iraq unfolding in any way like the certitude of this image implies? As time has passed in Iraq, a decade of sanctions has given way to military intervention and occupation by coalition forces. Landscapes that have been cleared of large amounts of infrastructure and services by economic mismanagement, sanctions, and war are in dire need of new development projects which would lend credence to the possibilities of "freedom oil." As Ole Wæver (1995, p. 54) states, "by naming a certain development a security problem," one claims a certain right to intervene. The current phase of the state's history is framed by the presence of sectarian violence and militarized bodies, and the simultaneous reconstruction effort. The U.S. state, for example, is deploying humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction contracts, and civic capacity building regimes as a central part of its military objective.

The national security apparatus thus takes as its target the hearts and minds of individuals and communities within Iraqi society—not purely as a form of military defense, but also to foster their growth and bring them in line with a specific economic and social model. The economics imagined by the narrative outlined above encourages the reading that once economic activity is entered into global flows of capital, there will be stability and security—not only in Iraq, but importantly in the broader landscape of neoliberal capitalism. As Frederick Kagan (2006, p.14), a neoconservative based at the American Enterprise Institute noted, "reconstruction is a vital part of stabilizing and securing the Iraqi population. The military commanders have been emphasizing this heavily. It is tremendously important. We're proposing that an economic team goes automatically into areas where the troops are sent in." The humanitarian work proposed by this expanded conception of security requires that both development and national defense happen simultaneously. Taking advantage of the opening of the economy and the liberalizing of

regulation, American financed projects ranging from hospitals to incinerators to power stations are thus being erected as fighting continues into its fifth year. Government reconstruction contracts are lucrative, and the financial incentive to counter the risk of building in this instable political landscape is clear. However, a recent article in the New York Times reported on the condition of eight of these reconstruction projects (Glanz, 2007). Many of these American financed and federally overseen projects have been revealed as failures—in many cases they are already crumbling from mismanagement, lack of oversight, and budget overruns. These projects should serve as models, demonstrating the efficacy of this monocultural mode of geopolitical development—taking advantage of the significantly reduced field of credible experience and molding the not yet into a globally scaled, modern, neoliberal capitalist tomorrow. However, there are inevitably fissures and gaps, zones in which the invisible can become visible and challenge the hegemony that this purported order claims as its unproblematic essence.

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By reading for these absences within this supposedly hermetic framework, I hope to have demonstrated that the economic legibility that has been rendered in Iraq has been part of a broader discursive project in which "that what does not exist is, in fact, actively produced as non-existent, that is, as a non-credible alternative to what exists" (Santos, 2004, p. 238). The twentieth century history of Iraq points to the erasure of a full 80% of economic activity through increased global resource use and waves of violence, sanctions, and tyranny: building upon the image that the only legitimate mode of development and stabilization will come by way of "freedom oil." Closer inspection of the war-zones reveals grey markets and shadowy actors that are both visible and invisible this singular rendering of economic order. And finally, new development projects should represent the power of this unitary economic vision of global neoliberal capitalism and convey the efficiency and productivity of global markets and institutions. However, as the walls of the newly constructed and unfinished infrastructure are quite literally crumbling, this image, too, may in fact reveal that what is truly non-existent in this mode of economic order is its latent instabilities.

## ENDNOTES

[1] This rejection and/or erasure of economic practices that fall outside of neoliberal capitalist orthodoxy leads to representations of economics as a singularity—*economic monism*—against which all other modes of economic existence are subsequently devalued (Gibson-Graham, J.K., Resnick, S., and Wolff, R. 2001).

[2] In an oft-cited exploration of the term governmentality, Foucault (1991) refers to it as the "art of government" which frames the "conduct of conduct."

[3] Foucault (2003) writes that these systems of classification serve to render particular conduct as the norm, while framing that which falls beyond the limits as abnormal.

[4] In 1972, during this period of rapid growth, Iraq's oil was nationalized, and distributions of surpluses followed a distinctly non-neoliberal or non-capitalist tract. This nationalization was an attempt by the state to garner a larger percentage of the profits from the sale of oil—much of which previously was being lost to foreign-run oil companies.

[5] UN Resolutions 660,661,662. Available at: http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0661.html

[6] UN Resolution 667: "Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;

(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and related major parts, and repair and production facilities" Available at: http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0667.html

[7] UNICEF argues that of this number, most were women and children. In 1999, then UN assistant to the Secretary General Denis Halliday resigned from his post in response to the negative effects of the sanctions. He said at that time: "We are waging a war through the United Nations on the people of Iraq. We're targeting civilians. Worse, we're targeting children... What is this all about?" (Pilger, 2004).

[8] UN Resolution 986. Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9247192.html

[9] Addressing displeasure with the media reporting on this event, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, "Stuff happens…Freedom's untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things. They're also free to live their lives and do wonderful things. And that's what's going to happen here."

[10] They are grey because they are not black markets—illegal economies outside of the structures of legally sanctioned capitalism—nor are they necessarily those structures either. The grey market, while offering a potentially misleading dialectic connection between two poles of legal and illegal, capitalist and non-capitalist, nevertheless serves well as a diagram of economic openings and potentialities at work under the monocultural regime.

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