WHERE DID THEY VOTE FOR LE PEN? GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATIONAL FRONT

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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper was to study a selection of socio-economic factors that may have influenced the 2002 French presidential election; specifically that an extreme right-wing political party, the National Front, gained support from voters reacting to select manifestations of globalization. We used correlation analysis to assess and interpret the support of Jean Marie Le Pen evident in departmental-level election returns. This study concluded that support for Jean Marie Le Pen was a function of the relative presence of two socio-economic factors at the departmental level: the percentage of immigrants and the rate of unemployment.

Keywords: Jean Marie Le Pen, National Front, Globalization, Immigration, Unemployment

INTRODUCTION

Since the effective end of the Cold War, popular writers and academics have identified an increase in the growth, success, and numbers of extreme right-wing parties in European elections (Betz, 2002; DeAngelis, 2003; Golder, 2003; Harris, 1994; Marcus, 1995; Merkl and Weinberg, 1997; Money, 1999; Schain, 2002). These parties and their locations in Europe evince a geographic distribution of political extremism in Europe.

Several studies attempted to explain the recent success of extremists in European elections (Betz, 1994; Golder, 2003; Money, 1999; Schain, 2002). These studies imply at least two important questions: would we recognize the rebirth of fascism in the post-industrial democratic world, and does the recent success of extreme right political parties signal a movement of democratic electorates towards neofascism as a political ideal in the time and space of globalization? These questions frame this research, which investigated two socio-economic correlates of political support for France’s National Front.

The 2002 French presidential election signaled the most recent and significant breakthrough of an extreme right-wing political party in Europe. The representatives of the two mainstream perspectives of the French “Left-Right political spectrum,” Lionel Jospin (Parti Socialiste, Left), and Jacques Chirac (Rassemblement pour la République, Right), and their supporters were shocked by the electoral breakthrough made by Jean Marie Le Pen (Front Nationale, Extreme Right) in the first round of presidential voting in March 2002. No candidate won a majority of the popular vote in the first round of voting, but Jean Marie Le Pen did gain enough votes (16.86%) to move to the second round in order to compete against Jacques Chirac (19.88%) and dislodge Lionel Jospin (16.18%) from the presidential contest. This occurrence put together two rightist parties in second-round competition for the first time in the Fifth Republic’s forty-four year history of normally scheduled presidential elections (Lewis-Beck, 2004).

The purpose of this paper is to study a selection of socio-economic factors that may have influenced the 2002 French presidential election; specifically that an extreme right-wing political party, the National Front, gained support from voters reacting to select manifestations of globalization. Such an outcome would be ironic given globalization’s ideals, which are cast as political and economic liberalism as well as technologically-driven economic expansion. Globalization may be understood as the increased integration of economically and culturally separated areas and peoples. A significant tenet of the National Front’s political platform and rhetoric is their pejorative characterization of globalization. We seek to assess a political effect of their platform. We used correlation to assess and interpret the support of Jean Marie Le Pen evident in departmental-level election returns. This study hypothesized that support for Jean Marie Le Pen was a function of the relative presence of two socio-economic factors at the departmental level: the percentage of immigrants and the rate of unemployment.

Unemployment and the Extreme Right

Structural unemployment is considered a
byproduct of post-industrial economies. This is particularly acute for semiskilled and unskilled workers (Knox et al., 2003). Golder (2003) included unemployment as an independent variable in his voteshare analysis of the extreme right’s national level electoral success in Western Europe. He concluded that unemployment matters when immigration is also a conspicuous electoral issue. Money (1999) initially used regression analysis of European national elections from 1962 to 1989 in order to predict the success of the extreme right in limiting immigration policies; however, she found statistical analysis at the national level was not sensitive enough to discern the socio-economic byproduct of post-industrial economies. This is particularly acute for semiskilled and unskilled workers (Knox et al., 2003). Golder (2003) included unemployment as an independent variable in his voteshare analysis of the extreme right’s national level electoral success in Western Europe. He concluded that unemployment matters when immigration is also a conspicuous electoral issue. Money (1999) initially used regression analysis of European national elections from 1962 to 1989 in order to predict the success of the extreme right in limiting immigration policies; however, she found statistical analysis at the national level was not sensitive enough to discern the socio-economic byproduct of post-industrial economies. This is particularly acute for semiskilled and unskilled workers (Knox et al., 2003). Golder (2003) included unemployment as an independent variable in his voteshare analysis of the extreme right’s national level electoral success in Western Europe. He concluded that unemployment matters when immigration is also a conspicuous electoral issue. Money (1999) initially used regression analysis of European national elections from 1962 to 1989 in order to predict the success of the extreme right in limiting immigration policies; however, she found statistical analysis at the national level was not sensitive enough to discern the socio-economic pressures on national policy making. She instead studied the concentration of immigrants in local electorates and concluded the stresses of immigrant v. citizen competition for scarce public resources and jobs significantly formed voters’ support for the ideas of the extreme right wing. But, this electoral support was only important to national government when they had the potential of swaying key constituencies during elections. At such moments, the electoral incentive of implementing the extreme right’s political ideas affects national legislation, policy, and thus further legitimizes their exclusionary discourse. This adds to the importance of place in understanding and evaluating immigrant communities in electoral politics, the distribution of resources (i.e. employment), and predicting the potential locations of where political opportunist will focus in order to advance their agenda.

Betz (1994) identifies national populism and neoliberal populism as two modes of European extreme right wing thought. Neoliberal populism is identified with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s economic ideals of “liberal-production.” The neoliberal economic policies of the 1980s increased domestic unemployment while reducing the concomitant stagflation of the period. These neoliberal policies and the international relations they created are often associated with the effects of globalization. These changes in unemployment may create an electoral niche for national populist’s economic ideas within the extreme right. This niche emphasized economic nationalism and protectionist trade policies to increase national employment, production, and cultural concentration that were perceived as diluted by international trade in goods and services.

**Immigration and the Extreme Right**

Harris (1994) describes the transition of European economies from industrial to post-industrial as representing a significant political-economic change leading to popular feelings of uncertainty and vulnerability. These popular feelings may foment a fear of the future, which girds a desire to rally against a perceived enemy. Immigrants are offered as the collective enemy of nationalists. The key to combating the resulting immigrant intolerance is accepting and facilitating the institutionalization of a multi-racial future that allows all members of society to participate in their collective governance. This is necessary, argues Harris, because the realities of labor shortages in Europe demanded immigration and because the state and nation benefited from sacrifices made by immigrants. These sacrifices demand popular support and representation within geographic locations; unfortunately, extreme nationalist parties seek to eliminate the political will of a significant and productive segment of states in order to keep mythical social tradition and processes alive. The author names and describes the trans-boundary presence of immigrants in Europe as the potential “thirteenth member” of the European Community. This number reflects the time of the author’s writing and is offered as a category of human representation that needs to be added into separate national governments and the cumulative European government. Without representation in government, the potential “thirteenth member” is then a vulnerable target for extreme right wing’s attacks and the concomitant mobilization of the electorate against them during uncertain economic and social conditions.

Harris’ writings implicitly develop the theme that the Westphalian concept of a “homogenous nation” of people with an absolute right to a geographical location engenders a concept of racial superiority, which justifies uneven political representation domestically, and further, violence between “national races” as a legitimate means of conflict resolution. Harris believes that this must be abandoned in order for humanity to further progress and the extreme right wing is fighting the future and the passing supremacy of nationalism over universalism. Harris points out that the intra-European success of extreme right wing political parties is not simply in election results, but in their ability to make racism and xenophobia part of respectable debate by the mainstream within the public space. The ability of the extreme right wing to cultivate this chauvinism is credited to a dormant racism left over from past imperial relations with foreign, non-European, populations and renewed efforts to make racism “scientific valid” through the use of intelligence quotient tests and popularly sensed domestic social conflicts between radically different “civilizations.” These ideas are further enhanced or misunderstood through the Right’s use of false
images of past social homogeneity and concomitant national greatness, which denies or purposefully fails to address the past extreme social disruptions and pains of history. These messages have found political traction in post Cold War Europe and are manifested in immigration control policies that implicitly encourage racism, while simultaneously denying the economic necessity and humanistic opportunity portended by immigration. The new right movement in contemporary France may be understood through the success of the National Front and its leader Jean Marie Le Pen. Both the National Front and Jean Marie Le Pen’s most successful national showing was in the 2002 French Presidential Elections.

MODELS

Specifically, we identified two socio-economic indicators of how the idea of globalization may influence individuals’ political behavior: immigration and unemployment. Our understanding of how these variables are conceptualized, quantified and measured is essential to building a cogent model for analysis. First (Model 1), globalization’s idealistic concepts of race and its neo-liberal economic ideology averse positive aspects of borderless, fluid labor immigration from countries of labor surplus and capital dearth to countries of labor dearth and capital abundance (Castles and Miller, 1993; Dicken, 2003; Freidman, 2003; Gwynne et al., 2003; Money, 1999; Stiglitz, 2003). Globalization is represented and felt by the individual voter through the increased presence of immigrants within a nation-state. Presumably, therefore, the greater the percentage of immigrants in a department’s population leads to a greater nationalistic backlash against globalization and thus produces voters more likely to vote for Jean Marie Le Pen. This is a xenophobic reaction to the presence of foreigners within the traditional nation-state’s mythological homogenized population. Citizens of the nation-state would seek to organize politically in order to elect leaders that would legislate more restrictive forms of access to citizenship and immigration procedures. Globalization may be measured not only by the relative presence of immigrants within a department, but also increased levels of unemployment (Ardagh, 2000; Betz, 1994; Golder, 2003; Money, 1999).

The first hypothesis assumes that citizen support for Jean Marie Le Pen and the National Front was a function of the presence of immigrants in a department (Model 1). To test this hypothesis the presence of immigrants in a department was measured as the total percentage of foreign-born residents. Alternative methods of quantifying this variable are by the percentage of naturalized French citizens or by the percentage of foreign residents that are not from European Union countries.

Second (Model 2), the restructuring of industrial state economies to post-industrial state economies has resource competition consequences for the population. The industrial economies’ mass-production methods, factories, assembly lines, and warehousing systems, demanded large volumes of semi-skilled and unskilled laborers; however, the post-industrial service and technology-based economies require many fewer semi-skilled and unskilled laborers resulting in large pools of unemployed workers (Friedman, 2003; Marcus, 1995; Money, 1999). Unemployed and “under-employed” workers would seek to organize politically in order to legislative more protectionist trade and manufacturing measures. These measures would seek to maintain higher levels of employment by limiting the mobility of domestic manufacturing and capital, and increasing tariffs on foreign goods and services in order to create greater demand for domestic goods and services which would spur domestic production and job growth (Gilpin, 1987; Golder, 2003; Money, 1999). Thus, globalization’s pressures can be measured as the relative amount of unemployment within a department.

The second hypothesis assumes that citizen support for Jean Marie Le Pen and the National Front was a function of the employment conditions in a department. To test this hypothesis employment was measured as the rate of unemployment in each department. Alternative methods of quantifying this variable are by the percentage of non-salary workers (wage labor), and percentage of non-professional jobs.

Model Context: Nationalism, France, and The National Front in a “Flat” World

Political interest groupings may be galvanized by the relative impact of globalization’s effects, manifesting themselves in nationalism and extreme right-wing movements. Nationalism may be understood as the exaggerated perception of the importance and presence of a distinct ethnic-state grouping that girds the identity of modern members of nation-states (Marcus, 1995). This identity is not necessarily racial or biological, but a construct of a common national mythological history with shared norms, values, and symbols (Money, 1999). Globalization’s pressures are often described as destroying the importance of the nation-state and the
political, economic, and cultural security it provided (Friedman, 2003; Graham and Poku, 2000; Kastoryano, 2002). Globalization’s changing of the nation-state’s status and the nation-state’s perceived homogeneity and order also threatens the individuals who most identify with the nation-state and have the most vested interests in the nation-state’s survival.

Nationalism and extreme right-wing conservatism are a political reaction to the stimulus of globalization and its inherently rapid and significant change. They seek to maintain the protectionism inherent in an anarchical world political-economic order, the autarky needed to maintain their sense of self-help, the desired absolute sovereignty over territory, and the imagined importance of their culture and ideas vis-à-vis a more integrated world community (Betz, 1994; Davies, 1999). Contemporary nationalism is not distinct from its other manifestations in European history; however, it is conspicuous in its growing influence despite the past ramifications of extreme nationalism and its anachronistic concepts. Globalization’s pressures can be seen in the political movements and electoral showings of a nation-state.

France is an important place in which to measure globalization’s pressures and their potential stimulating effect on the formation of nationalism and extreme right-wing movements. France has been an innovator in popular political participation since 1789. The country has experienced revolutionary democracy, oligarchy, dictatorship, constitutional monarchy, and representative democracy in many forms. The French Fifth Republic is currently dealing with the one of the most successful of extreme right-wing movements in democratic government of twenty-first century: The National Front.

Jean Marie Le Pen founded the National Front in 1972. Jean Marie Le Pen is often described as the personification of the National Front and its most recognizable member. He was educated as a lawyer, fought as a paratrooper in the French army and served intermittently French government since 1956. Taking an early identity with the Vichy government in the 1940s and the Poujadist movement in the 1950s, Jean Marie Le Pen set his ideological focus on maintaining a specific mytholog of French cultural-social “exceptionalism” that sought to curb the pressures of a cosmopolitan political-social-economic order (Betz, 1994; Marcus, 1995; Stevens, 2003). The National Front and Jean Marie Le Pen’s political significance in the time and space of the twenty-first century France have progressed with the rise of globalization; insidiously growing from nearly no political influence in the 1970s to a second place finish in the French presidential election of 2002.

The effects of globalization in France have created domestic political participation and political outcomes. These outcomes are manifested in electoral results, which serve as the mechanism for the formulation of legislation and policy by the popularly mandated government (Money, 1999; Farrell, 2001). Support for the National Front’s political message can be understood within the context of globalization and may be presented as our two hypotheses. Each of these hypotheses has alternate methods of quantifying variables. The alternative measurement of variables were used if the primary method of quantifying the variable proved to ineffectively capture of the potential effect of the phenomena of immigration and unemployment on Jean Marie Le Pen’s voteshare.

Model Interpretation and Discussion

The correlation results and mapping provided us with the necessary data to conduct our analysis of the electoral geography of France. We endeavored to assess the quantitative results and cartography of France with the qualitative information gained through our literature review and theoretical development. In attempting to evaluate the demonstrated relationships found, we investigated our modeled relationships’ apparent successes and failures. We did this for each of our two models in order to better understand Jean Marie Le Pen’s electoral showing in the 2002 French presidential election.

The results of correlation analysis between our three measures of the immigration variable and Jean Marie Le-Pen’s voteshare within the ninety-six metropolitan departments of France are shown in Table 1. Spearman’s Rho demonstrated the importance of the immigration measure using the percentage of non-European Union foreigners living in each department registering a 0.52 correlation coefficient (rho), highly significant at the 0.05 level. The first model tested the hypothesis that citizen support for Jean Marie Le Pen and the National Front was a function of the presence of immigrants in a department. The departments with higher rates of non-European Union residents correlated with higher support for Jean Marie Le Pen in terms of voteshare. Model 1’s hypothesis that citizen support for Jean Marie Le Pen and the National Front was a function of the presence of immigrants in a department was found to be positively correlated and statistically significant in the most conspicuous of the measures: percentage of non-European foreigners. This suggests that the relationship in Model 1, that immigration correlates positively with voteshare may
help explain the Le Pen voteshare in the departments. Our findings support previous research (Golder, 2003) showing that higher ratios of immigrants in Western European states correlate positively with greater electoral support for extreme right political parties in national elections. Our study contributes importantly by examining this relationship at a different spatial scale and historical moment. We examined the number of immigrants living in territorial units below the nation-state level, the department, in order to increase the spatial resolution presented in his analysis of cross-state elections. We provided a bridge from the nation-state level to the local level testing the voteshare at the departmental level in France. Our results also support Money’s (1999) earlier findings and Laurent’s suggestion (2004) that increased numbers of immigrants in proximity to native citizens spur political mobilization against immigrants and thus lend support to anti-immigrant political parties. Some scholars (Gran and Hein, 1997; Davies, 1999) argue that this response to immigration by the electorate may be in part due to perceptions of cultural assault by immigrants on current social norms, presumed social homogeneity and identity threats to the supposed sacrosanct character, essence and distinction of being French. The assessment of the non-European Union immigrant measure used in our analysis is telling in this regard. Among the three metrics we used for measuring the numbers of immigrants living in France’s departments, the non-European Union measure most likely to represent the “visible minority” or “visible immigrant.” This measure may thus be understood as representing the presence of the most readily observable immigrant, who may be then interpreted as being the most culturally different to voters. The apparently important role of visible minorities within the daily interactions of voters, coupled with expanding access and presence of visible media outlets, points to a reactionary element in the French electorate. The ideas put forth by Betz (1994), Harris (1994), Schain (2002), and Marcus (1995) that the National Front primarily benefits from its xenophobic policy prescriptions and “resentment politics” are supported by our correlation results.

Of the two independent variables we compared to Jean Marie Le Pen’s voteshare, the presence of immigrants in a department was the highest to co-vary with voteshare. However, given our correlation results we observed a puzzling situation in assessing the cartographic display of individual attributes by department. In accordance with our hypothesized relationship in Model 1, we would expect to find the National Front’s highest levels of support in departments containing the largest numbers of non-European foreigners. However, Figure 1 does not appear to support this relationship.

The departments with the highest rates of non-European Union foreigners do not fall within the top fifteen departments which supported Jean Marie Le Pen, and none of the nine departments registering 25% or more voteshare for Jean Marie Le Pen were in the top nine of the departments ranked by their percentage of non-European Union foreigner residents. Further, the five departments with the highest rates of non-European foreigners (i.e. the outlier departments: Seine Saint-Denis, Paris, Val de Marne, Hauts de Seine, and Val de Oise) are conspicuous in their relative lack of support for Jean Marie Le Pen relative to the percentage of immigrants living within their bounds. Of the thirty-five departments that supported Jean Marie Le Pen above the 20% electoral threshold, the majority (20) were in the middle third of departments ranked by their number of non-European Union foreigners, and no department ranked in the bottom quarter of all departments, by levels of non-European foreigners, registered above a twenty percent level of electoral support for the National Front. We recognize that there is a conspicuous lack of National Front support at either of the extreme levels of immigration (high and/or low). Based on our maps, we assess that areas of the highest immigrant concentrations and areas of the lowest immigrant concentrations do not support our hypothetical relationship between immigration and support for Jean Marie Le Pen, but departments in the middle third of immigration do support Model 1’s hypothesis.

The ability of the National Front to nuance their platform to these different departmental contexts is evident in their distinctive political rhetoric to voters living in areas experiencing higher and lower levels of immigrant settlements. Husbands (2002) described how the National Front refined their discourse to different social contexts under the rubrics of: “urban racism” and “urban strangers.” He uses the label “urban racism” to describe extreme
right argument that the material and cultural contacts enabled by the proximity and sum of everyday interactions between citizens and immigrants. This message is targeted to urban areas with large immigrant populations such as Marseilles, Paris, Dreux, Toulon, Lille, Lyon, Orange, and Nice (Davies, 1999). The “urban strangers” message is targeted to rural and semi-rural populations, which emphasizes a fear of unfamiliar immigrant populations as sources of social disorder (crime, unemployment, cultural change) living apart from native populations. The intent of using both of these messages is to attract voters in different contexts. But our findings may be interpreted as showing these messages as being most effective in departmental settings of average immigrant levels; the majority of the departments registering voteshares over the twenty percent threshold for Jean Marie Le Pen are ranked in the middle third of French population. The five departments with the largest percentage of non-European Union immigrant populations do not exceed the twenty percent voteshare threshold for Jean Marie Le Pen. This is also true for the departments with the smallest immigrant populations.

Table 2 shows the results of correlation analysis between our three measures of employment and Jean Marie Le-Pen’s voteshare within the ninety-six departments of France. Pearson’s correlation coefficient demonstrated the importance of the employment measure using the percentage of unemployed workers living in each department registering a 0.54 correlation coefficient. Model 2’s hypothesis that citizen support for Jean Marie Le Pen and the National Front was a function of the presence of employment conditions in a department was found to be positively correlated and statistically significant in the most distinct of the measures: the unemployment rate. This suggests that the relationship in Model 2, that immigration influences voteshare, is quantitatively supported by our analysis.

This finding also supports the previous work by Golder (2003) and Money (1999) at a more local scale. They suggest that when the material well-being of citizens is threatened by post-industrial restructuring and downsizing, often interpreted as a ramification of globalization, then some voters may react by voting for extreme right parties. Threatened voters act in order to effect change by influencing
Table 2. Correlation analysis between employment and voteshare, Model 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Kendall's Tau (Significance)</th>
<th>Spearman's Rho (Significance)</th>
<th>Pearson's r (Significance)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>0.332 (y/0.00)</td>
<td>0.468 (y/0.00)</td>
<td>0.54 (y/0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Non-salary occupations</td>
<td>-0.135 (y/0.026)</td>
<td>-0.203 (y/0.024)</td>
<td>-0.217 (y/0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Nonprofessional jobs</td>
<td>0.191 (y/0.003)</td>
<td>0.266 (y/0.004)</td>
<td>0.265 (y/0.005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and/or empowering political parties by virtue of each parties’ platform for policy prescriptions to combat the real or perceived loss of wages and/or job status. Money identifies the relative massing of immigrants in localities, formed by employment opportunities and chain migration as a “concentration of benefits” for business owners who employ low-wage immigrant workers and a “diffusion of costs” to the wider tax base of the state through the increased public needs of these immigrant populations for governmental services and goods (e.g. schools, sewers, etc) (Money, 1999, p. 34). The diffusion of costs at the state level may also manifest as concentrated costs at the local level. Local taxes pay for much of the social welfare and infrastructure needs of the public as guaranteed by the French model of public services; the department is an important level where these costs are dealt with by councils and prefects in terms of social services (Stevens, 2003). Thus, the department is an important level where competition for public and private resources occurs. Voters experiencing unemployment may, out of a survival instinct/materialist viewpoint, support exclusionary concepts such as “National Preference” in order to neutralize immigrant competition, real or imagined, for jobs and governmental services. The potential danger of this form of political capital is to legitimize racism in the public discourse and in every day interactions between residents, as citizenship is not a readily sensed attribute of people, whereas the perceived somatics of race would prove to be the essential characteristic of the exclusion natural to “National Preference.”

Golder (2003) further posits a linkage between unemployment and anti-immigrant sentiment in the electorate of western democracies. In the French context, this is evident in the National Front’s political rhetoric and campaign advertisements which announce, “two million unemployed means two million immigrants too many in France” (Davies, 1999, p. 45). This political discourse further conflates the presence of visible minorities with less economic opportunity for “native” French people, and creates an electoral niche for the National Front. This niche in France may be interpreted as a ramification of economic globalization as industries and services change the terms and forms of employment in advanced market democracies while, simultaneously, political globalization is removing the protections of social democracy and state regulation in the economy due to the supranational European integration called for in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (Ardagh, 2000; Marcus, 1995; Betz, 1994). The findings of Golder and Money that extreme right-wing political parties benefit from areas experiencing higher rates of unemployment are supported by our results. Of the two independent variables we compared to Jean Marie Le Pen’s voteshare, the rate of unemployment in a department was the highest to correlate with voteshare.

Examining this area cartographically, Le Pen did seem to benefit from areas experiencing high rates of unemployment (Figure 2). The unemployment measure’s four outlier departments: Bouches du Rhone, Pyrenees Orientales, Gard, and Herault are each among the top ten departments in terms of support for Jean Marie Le Pen’s voteshare (each department was above ~25% voteshare). Additionally, the French departments with the lowest rates of unemployment (i.e. the top one third of all departments in terms of having the highest departmental employment rates), contain only three departments that exceed a 20% voteshare for Le Pen.

The industrial areas specializing in iron, steel, and petroleum production in the north, northeast, south, and southeast correspond to areas experiencing more unemployment and with the major electoral support locations for Jean Marie Le Pen. From these spatial congruities between unemployment and support for the National Front, we may infer that voters in departments who have or had large amounts of industrial era organization (e.g. manufacturing plants, warehouse operations, natural resource extraction enterprises, etc.) and may be reacting to the economic change of post-industrialism by supporting the Jean Marie Le Pen’s advocacy for the economic protectionism and autarky as a rational economic choice. In other words, some threatened voters support political parties based on political-economic platforms that are interpreted as being in a voter’s best interest. These voters would support the economic status quo (or status quo ante), at the expense of future growth and technological advance that is often conflated with globalization’s creative destruction of current modes of production, services, and employment.
Globalization and the National Front

Additional research at the canton or commune level would further improve the spatial specificity by capturing this phenomena at a more refined level and potentially assist in quantitatively understanding the data presented in our analysis at a higher order of empirical rectitude.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that our results suggests that Jean Marie Le Pen and the National Front’s recent political success in the 2002 French Presidential election is in part a backlash to globalization. Globalization presents two catalysts to the autarkic political, economic and cultural ideas and practices of extreme right nationalist in France. First, the liberal ideals of political and cultural globalization, specifically globalization’s necessary concepts of cosmopolitanism and its inclusionary paradigms of immigration and citizenship, stimulates the mutually exclusive, protectionist and potentially racist ideas of the extreme right in France and Europe. Second, the neo-liberal economic philosophy of economic globalization changes the role of France’s socially democratic form of government and services in the economic lives of citizens. This creates a niche for the extreme right, personified by Jean Marie Le Pen’s anachronistic political solutions, in the political space of Europe and France’s domestic political contests for power and future policy direction.

The extreme right’s political solutions are designed to capitalize on the perceived vulnerabilities and uncertainty of some voters’ dealing with the presumed ramifications of globalization. The National Front attempts to reify the evils of globalization by conflating the images and assumed problems of immigration and unemployment with globalization. The intent is to create an ante-modern ideal for voters that struggle or do not want to accept the current and projected future modes of economic, political and cultural integration that portend the end of the Westphalian international system. The electoral successes of the extreme right in France and in Europe are due to their deliberate information campaigns, which are designed to return France and Europe to their previous norms of mutually exclusive...
national sovereignty and territoriality. The rise of the extreme right’s electoral fortunes is then due to the supposed circumstances created by globalization. This is supported by our statistical results and analysis. Some citizens may understand the exogenous variables of immigration and unemployment as being beyond their control and thus a part of the abstract force of globalization, which is assailed in the political vitriol of the extreme right. Future areas for further inquiry are voter age structure and education levels.

As the electorate of France continues to age due to their entering the putative fifth stage of the Demographic Transition and as governmental services and support erode due to intensification of globalization’s neoliberal ramifications on a socially democratic state structure. Additionally, the education levels of the French worker may eventually portend a latent constituency for extreme right-wing policies of protectionism if globalization fails to increase their quality of life and economic prosperity, but instead marginalizes more and more workers due to the noisome effects of capital accumulation in the hands of a few elites, whether in France or elsewhere. Further, the projected population growth of Africa and the Middle East and emigration to lands with declining populations, e.g. France, may also increase the xenophobic appeal of the National Front over the time and space of globalization. How globalization is understood and experienced may be the key to understanding future electoral choices and patterns in established and nascent liberal democracies throughout the world. Globalization may be the stimulus that converts voters from mainstream parties, cultivates new voters as they reach the age of majority, or motivates disinterested voters to choose the doctrine of the National Front as their ideal political solution.

ENDNOTES

1 In this study Globalization is contextualized as both economic and social liberalism. That is, in order for “different” nations to engage in more trade, investment, and other forms of social and economic interaction due to the compression of time and space, these different peoples must accept more universalistic concepts of “race” and assimilate certain cultural norms. Otherwise, these forms of interaction would incur increased cultural “frictions” with each exchange that ultimately would limit the efficiency logic inherent in Globalization. I do not believe globalization to be neutral on the topic of race. There is a necessary condition of cultural inclusion which facilitates the political and economic integration. This is often referred to as the “homogenizing effect” of globalization.

2 This paper is authored by one researcher. Any problems, faults and/or errors are mine alone. As a matter of style, I use the plural tense when addressing the study and my actions.

3 The Poujadist Movement was a post World-War II right-wing political movement led by Pierre Poujade. The movement was a reaction to the rapid social and economic change occurring in 1950s France. The movement coalesced around small shop owners and artisans reacting to their lost place in the French economy near the end of the Fourth Republic.

REFERENCES


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